Law Alumni Journal: Dean Louis H. Pollak by unknown
( 
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 
Ttll 
IJ\W N_U/\n 
JOUQ[ 
'· 
-· 
~ " . 
Spring 1976 
Volume XI 
Number] 
Dean Louis H. Pollak 
1
et al.: Law Alumni Journal: Dean Louis H. Pollak
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
'' 
Louis Pollak is a man of quiet dignity and great restraint; a superb lawyer whose 
commitment, skill, and talents were vital components of our (NAACP) landmark 
case, Brown v. Board of Education, 1954; and a scholar and teacher who has had 
tremendous influence in passing and developing superior lawyers. 
Roy Wilkins 
Executive Director and Secretary, NAACP 
Only in Philadelphia, home of the internationally beloved Flye~s. would there be 
a law school dean who has come closest to performing the deanship "hat trick." Lou 
Pollak has been Dean of Yale and now is Dean at Penn. A manifest destiny suggests 
that some third law school looms in the future. To list his achievements would seem 
puckish if asserted about anyone else. Indeed, one skates on thin ice in talking about 
Lou; the cold facts are incredible. For him, self-seeking and personal gain always 
have been beyond the line. The net of it amounts to deanships, distinguished profes-
sorship, just plain professor, civil rights lawyer, school board member, vice-president 
ofthe NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, activist father of five activist 
daughters and married to a lovely wife, author of innumerable scholarly articles as 
well as a history of the Constitution and the Supreme Court. But most of all he is one 
who has never taken his eyes off life's most important goals: truth, service to 
mankind, friendship, and thought. 
Jack Greenberg 
Director Counsel 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. 
Louis Pollak is genial and has a ready wit. Since he lives with (but does not 
preside over) a family of six women persons, his domestic environment has nurtured 
his tact. These engaging traits overlay other virtues, including guileless compassion, 
scholarly erudition, and calm judgment. Though special verdicts must pronounce on 
past events, old hands' prophesies are often humored; I foresee that the Pollak 
deanship will continue to be acclaimed. 
Clarence Morris 
Professor Emeritus 
University of Pennsylvania Law School 
One of my happiest contributions to the Law School during my tenure as dean 
was in helping to bring Lou Pollak to the school as the first Greenfield Professor. He 
is a person of great intellect, vision, and dedication. 
Bernard Wolfman 
Former Dean 
University of Pennsylvania Law School 
No one in this nation has had more wise or penetrating insights on the federal 
constitutional process than Dean Louis Pollak. He symbolizes the academic profes-
sion at its best. He has been more than an aloof critic; most important, he is an 
effective contributor to the improvement of the legal process in its day-to-day opera-
tion. As a Yale alumnus, I know that his leaving was a significant loss to that law 
school; but as a lecturer at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, I am pleased 
that, despite its fame and abundance of talent, Penn is now an even better school 
by having Dean Pollak here with us. 
Hon. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. 
U.S. District Court 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
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No one has exemplified qualities of justice more consistently than has Lou Pollak 
throughout his career. Tolerant, ever fair almost to a fault, and understanding, he 
never allows the stress ofthe moment to turn him away from his disciplined and 
informed sense of what is right. Do not be misled by his patience. He will steer a 
steady upward course toward the highest academic and professional standards 
attainable. 
Hon. Gerhard A. Gesell 
U.S. District Judge for the District of Columbia 
Be good, the sweet maid was told, and let who will be clever. It sounded like a 
sad, inevitable trade-off; but Louis Pollak unites a character on which the maid 
might model herself with an intellect that includes and transcends cleverness. As a 
jurist, scholarly or forensic or both, he adapts ingeniously chosen means with grace-
fully carved words in the service of nobly cherished ends. As a dean (at Yale, at least, 
but not last), he sought without sacrifice of principle to please those who could hardly 
be pleased, to like those it was hardest to like, to extend most sympathy to the least 
sympathetic. 
Leon S. Lipson 
William K. Townsend Professor of Law 
Yale Law School 
I have known Lou Pollak since he was, as the saying went in those days, "knee-
high to a grasshopper." I welcomed him to my classes back in the early post-war 
years. As colleague, I spent many pleasant and enlightened hours working with him 
in and out of the classroom. I watched him as dean in the late sixties handling some 
difficult problems with an understanding and firmness that won him the ultimate 
admiration of all factions, sub factions and spin-offs of factions. As a highly intelli-
gent, dedicated, and warm-hearted worker and critic, Lou Pollak has made a unique 
contribution to the progress of democratic values in our nation. 
Thomas I. Emerson 
Lines Professor of Law 
Yale Law School 
It has been my great good fortune to have known Louis Pollak and enjoyed his 
friendship since the early days of his deanship of the Yale Law School. I admire 
him for his fine intellect. More especially, I salute him as a gentle and pure spirit 
committed powerfully to that which is kindly and just in human relations. I make 
particular note of our efforts that, in common cause with others, brought about the 
establishment of the Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities in the Ameri-
can BM Association. That he has assumed the deanship of the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School pleases me beyond measure. 
Jefferson B. Fordham, Dean Emeritus 
University of Pennsylvania Law School 
Professor of Law 
University of Utah College of Law ' 
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Lou Pollak was an early crusader for equal rights, nationally as well as in New 
Haven. He was allied before the Supreme Court with Thurgood Marshall in a series of 
historic cases dealing with civil rights. Then, with Constance Baker Motley, a New 
Haven native and now a federal judge, he was the attorney of record in the Supreme 
Court case which resulted in the dismissal of miscegenation as a law against 
mankind. 
In our city during the fifties and sixties, Lou was on the side ofthe angels, 
although some differed on the color of the angels' robes. But to those of us who were 
fighting for the cause of equal opportunity, he was a genuine crusader willing to 
mount the barricades and repel the Philistines, and he did. He fought the good fight 
for quality education, and as a member of the Board of Education during my years in 
City Hall, he took as a personal challenge the city's obligation-indeed society's 
obligation-to provide quality education in all neighborhoods tnroughout our city. 
When he left New Haven, something special went out of all our lives. It is the 
good fortune of the University of Pennsylvania and Philadelphia to be the beneficiary 
of Lou Pollak's wisdom and leadership. 
Richard C. Lee 
Former Mayor of New Haven 
Connecticut 
The question is often put in a foolish way; would Lou Pollak give you the shirt off 
his back? Of course he would. But ifthe emphasis is altered a little-would Lou 
Pollak give YOU the shirt off his back-the answer is less simple. Yes, he would 
indeed, if he thought you were at heart warm, compassionate, generous, gentle--or 
would be if you hadn't been pushed around or been born the wrong color. He has all 
these traits to a degree that is almost unbelievable. I believe it because I had the 
privilege of working with him in the worst of times, when his goodness never faltered. 
Ralph S. Brown, Jr. 
Associate Dean 
Yale Law School, 1965-1970 
Simeon E. Baldwin Professor of Law 
Yale Law School 
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Alexander Capron, 
Acting Vice-Dean 
of the Law School 
' ' 
LAW ALUMNI DAY IS 
THURSDAY, APRIL 29, 
1976 
Professor Gorman to be 
Associate Dean 
Professor Robert A. Gorman will 
become Associate Dean of the Law 
School as of July 1, 1976. In the next 
Journal, we will report more fully 
Mr. Gorman's distinguished creden-
tials as well as on his responsibilities 
in this newly created position. 
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Acting Vice-Dean Capron 
Professor Alexander Capron will 
serve as acting Vice-Dean of the Law 
School until the spring semester's 
end, thus completing the term of 
Frank N. Jones, who resigned from 
that position in mid-January. 
The Vice-Dean heads most of the 
Law School's administrative offices 
and is the Dean of Students. A 
committee is presently in search of a 
permanent Vice-Dean. 
Biddle Library's 
Bicentennial Exhibit 
"Touched with Fire," a memorial 
exhibition marking the fortieth 
anniversary of the death of Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, is on view at 
the Law School until May 31, 1976. 
The show, Biddle Law Library's 
first contribution to the bicentennial 
celebration, has been borrowed from 
Harvard Law School and was 
mounted by Reference Librarian, 
Nancy Arnold. 
The exhibit contains copies of 
Holmes's letters to legal notables as 
well as photographs and 
memorabilia, a copy of Holmes's 
death mask by sculptor Gutzon 
Borglum, and a first-edition copy of 
Justice Holmes's distinguished legal 
text, his only authored book, The 
Common Law. 
Thomas A. O'Boyle Lecture 
to take place April 15 
The second Thomas A. O'Boyle 
Lecture will be delivered by Robert 
M. Loeffler, Trustee of the Equity 
Funding Corporation of America, on 
Thursday, Aprill5 at 4 p.m. in Room 
100 at the Law School. 
Mr. Loeffler's lecture "Post-
Mortem on a Corporate Fund," will 
analyze the causes of the collapse ,of 
the Equity Funding Corporation, 
describing some of the lessons to be 
drawn from this interesting chapter 
in U.S. financial history. 
Founded by friends and colleagues 
of the late Mr. O'Boyle, L'40, the 
Thomas A. O'Boyle Visiting Prac-
titioner Fund will sponsor the lec-
ture. The Fund's purpose is to induce 
experienced and distinguished prac-
titioners to make an educational 
contribution to the life of the Center 
for Study of Financial Institutions, 
Penn Law School, and the communi-
ty. 
The Owen J. Roberts 
Memorial Lecture for 1976 
will be held on 
October 18. 
Symposium 7 
Clerkships 1975-1976 
Two alumni of the Law School are 
serving as law clerks during the 
current academic year. We were 
recently made aware of their ap-
pointments and wish to acknowledge 
them at this time. 
State Courts 
Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County 
Judge Harry L. Hupp 
Elliot J. Hahn, L'74 
County Court of New Jersey, Cape 
May 
Judge Nathan C. Staller 
Judge James A. O'Neill 
David S. Yen, L'75 
A Reception for Third-Year 
Students 
In an effort to ease the transition 
from law student to active prac-
titiOner, Philadelphia Common 
Pleas Court Judge Doris M. Harris 
and the Board of Managers of the 
Law Alumni Society held an infor-
mal reception for third-year students 
in Courtroom 653 of City Hall. This 
afforded the students the opportuni-
ty to informally meet Common Pleas 
and Municipal Court judges and 
become acquainted with the court 
facilities. 
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8 Symposium 
Bernard Wolfman 
In July, former Dean Bernard Wolfman, L'48, will 
become the Fessenden Professor of Law at Harvard, 
continuing to teach in his field of specialization, federal 
taxation and tax policy. 
Mr. Wolfman is the fourth consecutive holder of the 
Fessenden chair to have been associated in some 
manner with Penn Law School or the University. Ralph 
Baker, L'll, a brilliant alumnus who distinguished 
himself in the area of corporation law was the first 
Fessenden Professor; following him was David Cavers, 
a University of Pennsylvania Class of'23 graduate; and 
his immediate predecessor, James Chadbourn, a 
member of the Penn Law faculty for many years, taught 
Wolfman evidence when he was a law student at the 
school. 
The decision to bring to a close his long-standing 
professional affiliation with the University of Penn-
sylvania and Penn Law School, which spanned the years 
beginning with his matriculation as an undergraduate at 
age 17, was a most difficult one. Wolfman joined the 
Penn Law faculty as a full-time Professor of Law in 
1963, became the Kenneth W. Gemmill Professor of tax 
law and tax policy in 1973, and served as Dean of the 
Law School from the year 1970 until his resignation in 
June 1975. 
Noyes Leech, Professor of Law and a long-time friend 
and associate of Mr. Wolfman expressed: 
Bernie's departure as a colleague and friend will be 
deeply felt. His outstanding accomplishments as 
our dean we acknowledged last year when he left 
for California. Now we are losing a brilliant teacher 
and fellow scholar and a colleague whose social 
conscience made a strong impression on those 
around him. I have known Bernie since our first 
week together at this Law School in 1946. I 
immediately admired his quick and restless mind. 
He seemed to have been born with a lawyer's 
instincts built-in. What was more, he always cared 
about the way the law worked (or didn't work). He 
told his students not to forget that they were "in the 
justice business." I will be sorry that my students 
will not also be taught by him. But we can 
understand his decision, after so many years at 
Penn, to look for another frame for his work and 
we thank him for all he has done for this school in 
the years past. 
Frank N. Jones 
One needed only to hear his eloquent speech last Law 
Alumni Day or to read excerpts from it in the Fall 1975 
Journal to recognize the deep and vital commitment felt 
by then Vice-Dean Frank N. Jones to the legal 
assistance movement. Before coming to Penn Law 
School two and a half years ago, he served as Executive 
Director of the National Legal Aid and Defender 
Association. Therefore, his return this past February to 
that organization and_ to his former executive position 
was like "going back where he belongs." 
In a letter notifying Dean Pollak of his decision to 
return to NLADA, Frank Jones wrote, "With the 
advent of the newly created National Legal Services 
Corporation, the legal assistance movement enters 
perhaps its most critical and sensitive phase. The 
decisions made in the next two years will, in my 
judgement, determine the course of legal services 
delivery and access to the justice system for decades to 
come. I very much want to actively participate in this 
process." 
Responding to Jones' departure, Professor Howard 
Lesnick, in a message on behalf of his colleagues stated: 
The faculty acknowledges and appreciates the 
contribution which Frank Jones has made to the 
life of the school during his tenure as Vice-Dean. 
We regret his decision to leave but take satisfaction 
as well as solace in the fact that his work will place 
him on the frontier of efforts to enhance the quality 
of legal representation, work which is, after all, not 
wholly unrelated to our own goals and function. 
We wish him well. 
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Featured event 
Instant Replay: The 1975 Keedy finals 
by Creed C. Black, Jr., L'76 
Four of the Law School's "fledgling lawyers" argued 
Lamb v. Farina before a distinguished panel of judges 
in the final round of the Edwin R. Keedy Cup moot 
court competition. Darius Tencza and Paul Zarefsky 
(counsel for respondent Farina) walked away with the 
coveted Keedy Cup, leaving Jeff Pasek and Bob 
Katzenstein (counsel for petitioner) with the satisfac-
tion of a job well done. 
Justice William Rehnquist, U.S. Supreme Court, 
presided over the panel which also included Chief 
Judge Frank Coffin, First Circuit Court of Appeals, 
and Judge Shirley Hufstedler, Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals. In announcing the court's decision, Mr. 
Justice Rehnquist termed the performances "very fine" 
and observed that all the participants deserved 
"commendation." (The Justice's first try at that word 
sounded much like "condemnation," producing a 
round of laughter.) Judge Hufstedler also found the 
competition to be "outstanding," adding that she took 
great personal pleasure in observing young lawyers at 
the "fledgling stage" of their exposure to the "ex-
hilarating arts of oral advocacy." Judge Coffin 
expressed his hope that advocacy of such a caliber 
might be seen "more often" in the federal courts. 
Noting the tendency of counsel to fluster slightly at 
difficult questions from the bench, he assured the four 
students that they would in time cultivate "more 
placidity" in pursuing their arguments. 
Editor's Note: The 1975 Keedy Finals were held on 
November 18. This excerpted account of the argument 
was reported in the January 21, 1976, issue ofThe 
Penn Law Forum, a bimonthly publication written and 
produced by students at the Law School. 
Lamb, on cert. to the Supreme Court, involved two 
ISSUes: 
I. Should the exclusionary rule be modified to 
admit evidence obtained under an invalid search 
warrant, where the police officers obtained and 
executed the warrant in good faith? 
2. Should a state criminal defendant be precluded 
from raising search and seizure claims on a federal 
habeas corpus proceeding, where those claims have 
been finally adjudicated against him in the state courts? 
The petitioner's position was that both of these 
questions should be answered affirmatively; the 
respondent argued in favor of the retention of the 
present exclusionary rule and the present broad scope 
of habeas review. 
Courteous and attentive, the judges permitted 
counsel to make their arguments without constant 
interruption; yet the panel did not hesitate to pose 
difficult questions directed at key weaknesses in either 
side's position. The comments of Judge Hufstedler set 
the tone of the argument; her sharp and penetrating 
grasp of the issues which she carefully pursued, 
frequently placed counsel on unfamiliar gound. Both 
she and Judge Coffin effectively challenged the careless 
use of statistics by counsel for both parties. Mr. Justice 
Rehnquist interjected an occasional question but did 
not press his point; his neutral attitude was surprising 
and, to some, a disappointment. His reluctance to 
become embroiled in disputes over the merits of the 
case, however, is perhaps explained by the fact that the 
Supreme Court has granted cert. in Rice v. Wolff, a 
real case raising the same issues as Lamb. 
9 
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fomethng to fay a perronal \liON 
The Prospects for Deregulation 
by Professor James 0. Freedman 
In an address to a joint session of Congress in October 
1974, President Ford called for the creation of a 
National Commission on Regulatory Reform "to 
undertake a long over-due total reexamination of the 
independent regulatory agencies." He has followed that 
request with a campaign for "deregulation"- a reduc-
tion in the amount of regulation of business now carried 
on by the administrative agencies of the federal 
government. 
President Ford in not alone in his concern for the 
failings of the independent regulatory agencies. Most 
modern Presidents, Democrats as well as Republicans, 
have been distressed by the performance of the 
administrative process and appointed commissions to 
recommend change. But few changes have resulted , 
even though several of the commissions produced useful 
reports. 
Although President Ford's advocacy of deregulation 
is generally regarded as the conventional conservative 
approach to economic matters, many liberals, such as 
Senator Kennedy, seem to share his conviction that 
basic changes are needed in the federal administrative 
process. 
Given the fact that conservatives and liberals alike 
have been dissatisfied for so long with the performance 
of the federal regulatory agencies, why have there been 
so few attempts at improvement by Congress? Why have 
the independent regulatory agencies been criticized so 
consistently but reformed so rarely? 
In my judgment, the problematic status of ad-
ministrative agencies reflects our failure as a society to 
resolve a basic ambivalence toward the idea of 
regulation itself. 
The decision to rely upon administrative agencies as 
dominant instrumentalities of modern government 
probably stems most directly from the impact of the 
Depression on American life. In addressing the 
economic problems created by the Depression, Presi-
dent Roosevelt created an armada of administrative 
agencies to carry out national policies of economic 
recovery and social reform. 
The New Deal's decision to rely so heavily upon 
This article is drawn from Freedman, "Crisis and 
Legitimacy in the Administrative Process," 27, Stanford 
Law Review, 1041 (1975). 
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administrative agencies to implement new national 
policies reflected practical considerations that had long 
been recognized: 
~ Administrative agencies could respond more 
promptly and flexibly than Congress or the courts to 
changes in the conditions being regulated. 
~ Because of their expertise and specialization, 
administrative agencies were far more likely than 
Congress to recognize subtle changes in industrial 
activity and to appreciate their regulatory implications. 
~Because of their relative freedom from judicial 
norms of procedure and from the heritage of the 
common law, administrative agencies were far more 
likely than courts to respond with innovative vigor, as 
well as a sympathetic commitment, to the purposes of 
the legislation they were administering. 
Although the remedies of the New Deal 
demonstrated the utility of the administrative process 
in meeting serious national problems, it seems clear in 
retrospect that the prominence that President 
Roosevelt gave to the administrative process was not 
the result of any well-thought-out philosophy of 
governmental action. Roosevelt was a pragmatist 
rather than a dogmatist, willing to replace one 
approach with another if it bore greater promise of 
success. 
The New Deal represented a national commitment-
born of the social consensus of the time and broadly 
supported by a majority of Americans ever since-that 
there should be increased governmental intervention in 
the economy. 
The apparent success of the variegated responses 
that Roosevelt fashioned to meet the nation's exigen-
cies served to obscure the fact that he lacked a coherent 
philosophy of when, and to what degree, such 
governmental intervention was appropriate-except, 
of course, that it should stop somewhere short of 
complete governmental planning of economic activity 
and decisions. 
To the present day, Americans have failed to develop 
or agree upon a coherent philosophy of governmental 
activism in economic matters. The nearest approach our 
society has made to achieving such a philosophy has 
been to secure general agreement for the proposition 
that the appropriate extent of governmental activism in 
Something to Say 11 
planning and controlling the economy lies somewhere 
between the polarities defined by Adam Smith and Karl 
Marx. 
An ideology of such imprecision may befit a 
pragmatic people, but is hardly adequate to delimit the 
perennial debate that our society conducts on the 
proper role of government in regulating the economy. 
When a nation cannot find the intellectual 
wherewithal to formulate a coherent ideology on an 
issue as fundamental to its values as the balance to be 
struck between a free market and state regulation, such 
regulation as it does authorize will always be subject to 
philosophic as well as pragmatic question. 
And as long as the legitimacy of governmental 
regulation is subject to question, the legitimacy of 
administrative agencies assigned to carry out specific 
tasks of regulation will also be challenged. 
The ambivalence that has frustrated our attempts as a 
society to arrive at a coherent ideology of governmental 
activism has also caused Congress to legislate most 
economic regulation in evasive generalities, leaving to 
the respective administrative agencies the essential tasks 
of evolving regulatory policies. 
One result of the simplification implicit in such broad 
delegations of legislative power has been to make 
administrative agencies, rather than Congres.s, the arena 
for debate and decision on complex policy questions of 
fundamental importance to our democracy. 
Many agencies have been criticized for their failure to 
develop coherent policies in the course of their 
regulatory activities. Yet when Congress has failed to 
adopt a set of social preferences for resolving such 
difficult issues as typically lie behind broad delegations 
of power, an administrative agency, itself now exposed 
to the conflicting political forces that led Congress to 
shrink from a decisive response in the first instance, can 
hardly be expected to do better. 
President Ford recently told a meeting of the 
chairmen of the federal regulatory agencies that 
"government should intrude in the free market only 
when well-defined social objectives can be attained." 
A program of deregulation will require Congress to 
specify the social objectives it seeks to attain by its 
particular programs of economic regulation. 
Perhaps the present climate will embolden Congress 
to make those hard decisions. But if past is prologue, 
the prospects are not promising. 
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12 Professor Bender on Abortion: 
~hould CZhere 
Be a Coflstitutional 
c:Amendment? 
Paul Bender, Professor of Law, delivered this statement 
on February 5, 1976, to the Civil and Constitutional 
Rights Subcommittee of the House Committee on the 
Judiciary, in Washington, D.C. His testimony, 
reprinted here in its entirety, probes the question of 
whether there should be a constitutional amendment 
designed to overrule the Supreme Court's 1973 abortion 
decision (Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.113.). 
1. Before addressing the specifics of any of the three 
main types of proposed abortion amendments, it seems 
to me important to ask whether it is wise, at this time, to 
attempt any amendment primarily designed to overrule 
the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade. For a 
number of reasons, I do not favor any such amendment 
at the present time. 
As a general matter, it has not been part of our 
constitutional tradition to amend the Constitution in 
response to unpopular and assertedly erroneous 
Supreme Court decisions recognizing new con-
stitutional rights. Were Roe v. Wade to be overruled by 
an amendment, thus eliminating a right found by the 
Court to be inherent in the due process guarantee of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, that would, so far as I know, 
represent a unique event in American constitutional 
law. 
I think our traditional restraint in this regard has been 
wise, and I believe it has had more than a small part in 
shaping a society which is widely and properly admired 
throughout the world for its generous and responsible 
recognition of individual rights. The Supreme Court 
may, indeed, make mistakes. In my view, the contem-
porary Court most often errs in the direction of too 
little- rather than too much-recognition of rights, but 
the possibility certainly exists that the Court may, at 
times, carry rights too far. Short-term discontent with 
Court decisions in this area is not, however, a valid 
guide to when the Court has erred. Most decisions 
which have newly recognized rights and which have also 
provoked an immediate critical reaction by substantial 
segments of the public-one thinks, for example, of the 
segregation cases or the reapportionment cases- have 
ultimately come to be thoroughly accepted by almost 
everyone as parts of our constitutional fabric. 
Moreover, where the Court does err and where a 
consensus of responsible opinion develops over the 
course of time to that effect, the Court is capable of 
pulling back in subsequent decisions or of injecting 
modifications and exceptions. 
This system of primarily judicial evolvement of our 
constitutional rights has, I repeat, worked very well, 
although it has surely not been perfect. But we do not 
know of any better structure, and we can observe many 
that are worse. To create a precedent in favor of the 
quick overruling of Supreme Court decisions vin-
dicating constitutional rights might upset the balance of 
our system so as to cause us much future grief. We 
should run that risk, if ever, only in the very unlikely 
event that a decision proves fundamentally wrong and 
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II 
I! 
dangerous by the test of time and where the Supreme 
Court, for some reason, remains enduringly oblivious to 
that fact. 
Coming to the specifics of Roe v. Wade, I also do not 
favor these amendments because I think that that case-
hard case that it was- was probably correctly decided 
and was certainly not so clearly incorrectly decided as to 
warrant the unprecedented action of overruling through 
amendment. If ever used, that process should be 
reserved for cases that are clearly and demonstrably 
wrong. We should not tamper with our Constitution 
unless we are sure we are right. 
The Court in Wade held that the right to abortion is 
part of the fundamental right of substantive personal 
privacy- the right to be one's self. This right of privacy 
affords restrictions on governmental interference with 
personal activities that are so intimate in nature and so 
related to the expression and pursuance of individual 
personality, belief, and taste- to the "pursuit of 
happiness" referred to in the Declaration of 
Independence- that the private citizen must be per-
mitted to make his or her own value choices. In most 
cases the private activities covered by the right to 
privacy are also of little or no legitimate interest to 
others in the society or to the government. 
The Supreme Court has applied -the right of privacy 
primarily to matters of sexual conduct, childbearing, 
and child raising, and most of its decisions have, I think, 
struck a responsive chord in the nation as a whole. The 
principle of substantive privacy is alive and growing. 
Viewed as a protection of a woman's right to decide 
whether or not to have children and how to use her own 
body and mind, the abortion decision fits well within the 
principle. 
It is urged, however, that the abortion cases are 
different because, unlike other privacy cases, they 
involve a legitimate governmental reason for interfering 
with privacy. That reason is the protection of the fetus. 
Whether or not the fetus is a "person" under the law, it is 
at least a specifically potential person. It is also 
sometimes suggested that antiabortion laws do not 
interfere with privacy to as great a degree as some other 
laws which affect the use of one's own body because the 
need for abortion can be avoided through the use of 
birth control. 
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It may be that the development and availability of 
birth control technology will eventually justify the 
conclusion that antiabortion laws do not constitute a 
significant interference with privacy. That would 
require a universally available and universally safe 
method of birth control, and it would also require a 
comprehensive and thoroughgoing program of univer-
sal sex education from a very? early age, so that what 
was theoretically available in the way of birth control 
would also be practically available to everyone 
whenever needed. Our present birth control practices 
fall far short of this standard. 
The constitutionality of abortion laws under the 
principle of substantive privacy thus turned, at the time 
of Roe v. Wade, and still turns, on a balancing of 
women's constitutionally protected privacy interests, on 
the one hand, against the State's interest in protecting 
fetal life, on the other. There are several reasons why I 
believe that the Court's decision in favor of the 
constitutional privacy interests cannot be said to have 
been demonstrably wrong. 
First, as a general proposition, it is not clear just how 
strong the fetal interests are which we must weigh 
against privacy. We still do not know- and may never 
know-the extent to which the fetus, at various stages of 
its development, is conscious of sensation or reason. 
Such consciousness would not seem very probable at the 
earliest stages of pregnancy. It is true that it can be 
argued with some force that fetal interests surpass 
women's privacy interests at some stage of the 
developmental process prior to birth, but the Court, 
recognized this view in Wade by protecting abortion at 
early- but not at late- stages of pregnancy. Given the 
constitutional protection for the use of contraceptives, a 
line needs to be drawn somewhere, and I should think it 
would be hard to say with assurance that the Court 
clearly drew the line in the wrong place. Furthermore, 
many proponents of antiabortion legislation seem 
themselves to recognize that the state's interest in 
protecting fetal life is, at best, substantially weaker than 
its interest in protecting human life generally. I see no 
other way to explain the commonly proposed excep-
tions for abortions necessary to save the mother's life or 
health or for abortions requested by the victims of rape. 
We do not normally permit one person to take another 
: 
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person's life to save his or her own life or health when the 
person killed was entirely blameless. We certainly would 
not ordinarily permit a person to be killed because he or 
she was conceived as the product of a rape. 
A second group of reasons for suspecting the strength 
of the fetal interest-as weighed against the woman's 
privacy interest- flows from the fact that antiabortion 
legislation primarily affects women's privacy rather 
than men's. Our society has, unfortunately, not always 
been as alert as it should be to protect against laws which 
uniquely harm women. It is relevant, I think, that we do 
not know how antiabortionists would weigh the 
competing fetal and privacy interests if vindicating the 
right to fetal life caused men, as well as women, to suffer 
an intrusion similar to that resulting from the compul-
sion to carry ~n unwanted child in one's body. 
Finally, the probable correctness of Roe v. Wade is, 
for me, supported by the practicalities of the enforce-
ment of antiabortion legislation. However evenhanded 
such legislation might be in theory, we know that it has 
not been and, indeed, cannot be, comprehensively and 
evenly enforced. People who are financially better off 
than the average will often be able to obtain both legal 
and illegal safe abortions despite antiabortion legisla-
tion in the state where they live. Poorer people, on the 
other hand, are much more likely to experience either a 
real deprivation of access to abortion or to be driven to 
submit themselves to horrendously unsafe procedures. 
Again, we do not know how the competing fetal and 
privacy interests would be weighed if everyone- not 
only the poor and not only women- were to be 
subjected to this kind of oppression by antiabortion 
legislation. The choice is not as between abortion and no 
abortion, it is between safe abortion and unsafe 
abortion and between abortion for the wealthy and 
abortion for everyone. The Supreme Court's opinion in 
Roe v. Wade did not directly allude to some of these 
factors regarding discriminatory effects upon women 
and the poor, but they may have been in the Court's 
mind. In all events, these factors certainly seem relevant 
to the question of whether Wade can properly be 
considered a demonstrably erroneous decision. 
2. With regard to the specific amendments before 
the subcommittee, the outline of suggested issues states 
that they are of three main types. The first type would 
say that the fetus is a "person" within the meaning of the 
Constitution and would prohibit any person from 
terminating the life of a fetus. The second type would 
declare that the fetus has a right to life and would 
prohibit government from depriving the fetus of that 
right without due process. The third type would permit 
the states, or Congress, or both, to legislate on the 
subject of abortion. 
There are enormous technical and conceptual 
problems with the first type of amendment, which 
makes the fetus a person and which seeks directly to 
protect the life of the fetus against private as well as 
governmental action. Our Constitution does not 
ordinarily seek to limit private action or to adjust 
interests between private persons. The Thirteenth 
Amendment forbids private, as well as governmentally 
imposed, slavery, but it is unique in thus directly 
addressing private conduct. Normally, it is the 
prerogative of the states to decide what rights persons 
should have against other persons. Thus, even if the 
fetus is to be deemed a person for all constitutional 
purposes, I should think it wisest and most consistent 
with the general federal-state allocation of respon-
sibilities to leave it up to the states to decide, in the first 
instance, how that person is to be protected. Moreover, 
if there were to be a direct federal constitutional fetal 
right against abortion, the question would arise how 
that right w·as to be enforced. Will the states somehow 
be affirmatively required to pass and enforce antiabor-
tion legislation, or does the amendment contemplate 
federal antiabortion laws and federal enforcement 
machinery? Neither of these seems an attractive alter-
native. 
The first type of amendment would also take all 
constitutional protections presently given persons and 
would apply them to the fetus. There are serious 
difficulties here. Think, for example, about how the 
equal protection clause would apply to the fetus. Would 
states which generally permit tort recovery for 
negligence be required to permit tort action against 
mothers by their children for negligently taking drugs 
during pregnancy which result in deformities at or after 
birth? Many states, I suspect, would not want to 
entertain such suits in view of the great danger of 
collusive litigation. 
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While the first type of amendment may go too far in 
involving the federal government too directly in 
deciding whether or not to permit abortion, the second 
type, declaring a right to life and prohibiting the states 
or the federal government from depriving the fetus of 
life without due process, does not seem to me to go far 
enough to accomplish their objective. Although some 
abortions are performed by employees of the govern-
ment, many abortions are also performed by private 
doctors in private institutions. A constitutional prohibi-
tion directed merely to state deprivation of fetal life 
might leave these private abortions unregulated, and it 
might also fail to validate those state prohibitions on 
private abortions that Roe v. Wade held un-
constitutional. There would also be difficulty, I believe, 
in determining how to afford the fetus procedural due 
process before the decision whether or not to abort is 
made. 
At the same time as these right-to-life amendments 
may be under-inclusive in failing to overrule Roe v. 
Wade, they may be dramatically over-inclusive in 
seeking to "guarantee" fetal life. Such an abstract 
guarantee suggests affirmative duties on the part of the 
states. Is it intended, for example, that the states be 
required to provide free prenatal care to all pregnant 
women so as to avoid miscarriage and fetal death 
wherever possible and so as to ensure the healthiest 
possible fetus and child? 
The third type of proposed amendment seems to me 
to create less difficulty than the other two. Authorizing 
the states to prohibit or regulate abortion if they wish to 
do so overrules Roe v. Wade without depriving the 
states of the prerogative of deciding whether or not they 
want to make all or some abortions illegal. The ordinary 
division of responsibilities between state and federal 
governments , as I have noted above, counsels in favor of 
permitting states to permit abortions , if they wish to do 
so. 
Nor would it seem to me to be wise to authorize 
Congress, as well as the states, to prohibit abortion, as 
some of the type-three amendments would do. That 
would raise the possibility of Congress prohibiting 
abortions within states whose citizens want to permit 
them- another federal invasion of state prerogatives. If 
state abortion laws were to be permitted through the 
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amendment process, it would also seem to me to be best 
to thus validate orily those laws which are enacted after 
the proposed amendment is adopted, rather than 
reviving laws which may have originally been enacted 
decades before Roe v. Wade struck them down. Women 
whose privacy is to be affected by an antiabortion 
constitutional amendment would seem to me to be 
entitled, at the very least, to a fresh, contemporary 
legislative decision on the question. I would also think 
some serious problems lurked behind a provision 
authorizing legislation designed to protect life at every 
stage of biological development. Unless there is an 
intention to overrule the contraception as well as the 
abortion cases, proposed amendments should be 
explicitly limited to authorizing legislation protecting 
the fetus at some time after conception . Finally, it would 
seem to me to be extremely unfortunate to adopt any 
amendment which would authorize prohibiting even the 
so-called morning-after pill, which may turn out to be 
the safest and most effective contraceptive that our 
technology can derive. Whatever the merits of the 
abortion controversy, there appears to be general 
agreement that the right of privacy encompasses at least 
the decision whether or not to use contraceptives, as 
recognized in the Supreme Court's decision in Grisold v. 
Connecticut and Eisenstadt v. Baird. The distinction 
between a day-before and morning-after pill seems to 
me too fragile to support a constitutional dividing line 
by way of amendment. 
While I believe that a "states rights" type of 
amendment, properly limited, is thus the most accept-
able type of proposal before you, I do not want to leave 
you with the impression that I favor such an amend-
ment. For the reasons given in the first part of this 
statement, I emphatically do not favor any amendment 
designed to overrule Roe v. Wade at the present time . I 
would not lightly substitute majoritarian decision 
making for the judicial evolution of our rights, which 
has worked so well over the course of years . In the area 
of the right of privacy, specifically, an amendment 
overruling Wade would create the danger of chopping 
off the development of this new right while it is still in 
the process of early evolution, and of thus frustrating-
and even terminating- a basic contitutional principle 
that rings true to the vast majority of the people. 
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Editor's Note: Stephen R. Goldstein, 
Professor of Law, is a native 
Philadelphian who received his A. B. 
from the University of Pennsylvania 
in 1955 and his LL.B., summa cum 
laude,from Penn Law School in 
1962, where he was Research Editor 
of the Law Review. 
He practiced law in Philadelphia 
from 1962-64, and then served as law 
clerk to Justice Arthur J. Goldberg 
ofthe U.S. Supreme Court. Mr. 
Goldstein joined the Law School 
Faculty in 1955, spent the year 1970-
71 as Visiting Professor of Law at 
the University of California in 
Berkeley, and was Visiting Professor 
at the Hebrew University in 
Jerusalem, Israel, during the 1974-75 
academic year while on sabbatical 
from this Law School. 
Professor Goldstein currently 
teaches courses in civil procedure, 
religion and the law, Jewish law, and 
education law, an area in which he 
has done extensive practical as well 
as scholarly writing. 
Journal: Your course in Education 
Law encompasses a wide spectrum of 
issues. How do you approach the 
course and what areas does it in-
clude? 
Goldstein: It essentially concerns 
itself with the variety of legal 
problems involving government-
funded education below the college 
level. 90 percent of the course is 
about public schools, while the other 
10 percent is about the legal problems 
involved in government funding of 
non-public schools, including 
questions about new concepts like 
voucher systems, to replace the 
existing set-up of a sharp dichotomy 
between public and private schools. 
The course covers a variety of 
problems, the first two-thirds per-
taining to the individual and his / her 
relationship to the school: who has 
the right and who is compelled to 
attend school; who determines 
curriculum; the respective legal roles 
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of teachers, administrators, school 
boards, legislators, students, parents, 
community groups, etc.; the rights of 
expression of students and teachers; 
problems concerning special educa-
tion, homogeneous vs. 
heterogeneous groupings, classifica-
tions of students; procedural stan-
dards that have to be followed in 
student discipline; teachers' roles in 
curriculum. The list goes on and on. 
The last third of the course deals 
with more general systemic problems 
like desegregation, community con-
trol and decentralization, the finan-
cing of education, aid to non-public 
schools, and collective bargaining. 
The three organizing principles 
around which the course is based deal 
first with the question involved in the 
allocation of the decision-making 
power in the schools, and who has the 
right to present its views in the 
process of that decision-making. 
Second, we study how accommoda-
tion is achieved in a society that 
wishes to use education to inculcate 
values to its youth and yet maintain 
its democratic principles of 
autonomy, individuality, and the 
freedom of its people, including 
youth. We also examine the accom-
modation of two other competing 
areas-that of the secularist, univer-
salist values on which our country's 
philosophy, at least in part, is based, 
which conflicts with the desire to 
allow for the development and 
existence of ethnic, religious, and 
racial sub-groups. Finally, I think of 
the course as methodological, heavily 
concerned with questions as to what 
the roles of law and the courts are in 
entering into these issues and in 
trying to solve them. 
Journal: Related to this area, 
thirty-three states in the U.S. have 
instituted programs holding teach-
ers, professional administrators, and 
school boards accountable for 
providing students with guaranteed 
educations. What are your thoughts 
on such accountability and, 
specifically, the entrance by the 
courts into educational malpractice 
suits? 
Goldstein: There is no way one can 
argue that people who are paid to do 
a job ought not be accountable for 
how well they do it, particularly when 
they are paid out of the public 
pocket. Now, how a teacher's perfor-
mance is measured and how much 
one can expect teachers to do is very 
difficult to ascertain. And just who 
shall do the evaluating? In a law suit 
in California, under a rubric of 
accountability, there is an attempt to 
have a court and jury be the deciders 
by having a suit for damages for 
educational malpractice against 
teachers or school systems who have 
not done their jobs. It seems to me 
that our knowledge, at this time, of 
what is malpractice and how much 
can be attributable to a school 
system's failure is so minimal that the 
concept of having the court award 
damages under a malpractice suit is, 
to me, a very bad and wrong one. 
I think we may expect too much 
from school systems as an entity in 
terms of increasing the learning of a 
great deal of students. The pre-school 
years, I believe based on what I have 
read, may be more influential than 
the later ones in determining how 
well students do. One cannot ignore 
the impact of environmental in-
fluences affecting them, and we must 
keep in mind that school time is only 
a segment in the scheme of learning. 
Granted school systems should be 
held responsible for trying to do 
some things but there is much more 
to consider in my way of thinking. 
Journal: Academic freedom at all 
levels of education seems to be an 
area to which you are quite com-
mitted. In a lecture recently publish-
ed in the Israel Law Review, you 
examined the rights of university 
professors to express controversial 
statements unrelated to their 
professions. Can you encapsulate 
your article which will be published 
this spring by the Penn Law Review 
on another aspect of academic 
freedom? 
Goldstein: This article is longer and 
more legally-oriented than the lec-
ture on university professors. It 
explores what Constitutional rights, 
if any, public school teachers have to 
I 
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determine what they teach in their 
individual classrooms over the objec-
tions of their superiors in the state-
sanctioned hierarchy. 
I ultimately concluded that there is 
no such Constitutional right of 
teachers to teach what they desire in a 
public school system. 
When it comes to certain decisions 
like the establishment of a political 
philosophy or a given moral system, I 
concluded that, in the light of our 
history and societal sense in this 
country as to the role of education 
below the college level, the Federal 
Constitution does not forbid local 
school systems and local officials 
from attempting to inculcate or 
indoctrinate value judgments 
through the instructional process in 
the schools. Now, I don't want to say 
that this is necessarily desirable, but 
this article focuses on what is 
constitutionally permissable. 
Journal: Can you describe your 
course on Jewish Law? 
Goldstein: I officially joint teach it 
with Dr. Barry Eichler, the Vice-
Chairman of the Oriental Studies 
Department, who is a brilliant guy. 
Actually, we prepare together and 
although I comment in class, it really 
is more his course than mine. 
It is essentially a comparative law 
course in which we attempt to teach 
the dynamics and development of 
Jewish law from the perspective of 
how a legal system can and does 
adapt to change as required, despite 
its "unalterable constitution". Our 
concern is with the study of the 
historical development of the system, 
and we teach it in three sections: the 
first is the investigation of biblical 
law and its relationship to other 
middle eastern legal systems; the 
second area of study is post-biblical 
Jewish law focusing on the Talmud in 
terms of the development of the 
process, bringing it up to modern 
times; in the final unit, we deal with 
the topic of abortion, treating it 
through the entire development of 
Jewish law. 
Journal: Are students taking this 
course and others like it that might be 
of an enrichment nature? 
Goldstein: The course did not 
attract quite as many students as it 
had two years ago when we offered it. 
Maybe one of the reasons is that it 
has lost popularity but, also, the Law 
School has done away with dis-
tributional requirements, where 
students had to take so many hours 
from a specified area which might 
have been labeled perspective or 
enrichment. Jewish Law fell under 
this category. 
My sense is that the general trend 
of the student body, in part because 
of the glutted job market and 
problems allied to this, is more 
focused on the traditional "bread-
and-butter" courses. I think this 
trend unfortunate. Students have the 
next forty years to practice law and if 
they don't get these courses now, they 
never will experience them. This is 
really the last opportunity to get 
some enrichment before they become 
very much narrowed in the practice 
of law. 
Journal: You and your family 
spent the 1974-75 academic year on 
sabbatical in Israel. Can you tell us 
why Israel? What did you do 
professionally while there? 
Goldstein: Two reasons influenced 
our choice. Essentially my wife , two 
children, and I wanted to live in Israel 
for a year. Also, the Hebrew Univer-
sity in Jerusalem invited me to come 
as a visiting professor. They also had 
facilities- libraries and materials in 
American law- in order that I might 
continue my research on Problems of 
American Education Law. Although 
this had little to do with Israel, I did 
investigate the Israeli educational 
system and did some work related to 
the Jewish Law course mentioned 
previously. 
Although afforded all privileges 
given a visiting professor, I did not 
teach per se at Hebrew University. 
On occasion, I guest lectured for a 
course that was offered on freedom 
of expression; they were particularly 
interested in American ideas con-
cerning academic freedom. I also 
gave a lecture to the law faculty, at 
the request of the Dean of the Law 
School, on the basic premise of 
academic freedom. This was 
prompted by an issue that caused 
notoriety at the University involving 
the rights of a chemistry professor 
who had participated in some ac-
tivities in support of the so-called 
Palestine Liberation Organization. 
I did teach a course in American 
Constitutional Law at Bar-Ilan Law 
School, a part of Bar-Ilan University 
in Ramat Gan, at the urging of the 
dean who is a long-time friend . I 
taught fifteen once-a-week sessions 
and, in retrospect, although reluctant 
to give the time initially, found it a 
most rewarding experience. The 
students were extraordinarily recep-
tive, and it was great teaching 
American legal principles to people 
who have not grown up in our 
system. It gave one an entirely 
different perspective on the material. 
Journal: In what language did you 
lecture- English or Hebrew? 
1 
1 
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Goldstein: Now that was an in-
teresting story. The original un-
derstanding was that I would speak 
in English and the students would 
speak to me in Hebrew. Although 
their comprehension of English was 
quite good, they were reluctant to 
speak it, so the original plan worked 
out well. As I became more fluent in 
Hebrew and was more comfortable 
using it, I switched and, by the end of 
the course, was teaching in it 
predominantly. The materials used, 
mostly U.S. Supreme Court cases, 
were in English, of course, so some 
English had to be used. The transla-
tion problems were challenging and 
an important part of the course. If 
one decides how properly to 
translate, for instance, the English 
term "establishment of religion in the 
first amendment", essentially one is 
determining what the term means in a 
very significant way. 
Journal: How did you and your 
family fare language-wise? Was it 
important to be able to speak 
Hebrew? 
Goldstein: I had some Hebrew-
speaking background but became 
more proficient as the year progress-
ed. Hebrew University offered a class 
for faculty which was very good, and 
my wife went to a club for im-
migrants in Jerusalem where she 
took a government-sponsored 
course. 
It is important to speak or, at least, 
to understand the language. One can 
get along quite well speaking English 
as a tourist but, to be part of the 
social life of the country and to know 
what is going on, one should under-
stand the radio, TV, and be able to 
read the newspaper. By the time I left, 
I was reading a Hebrew newspaper 
not as fluently, however, as I might 
have The New York Times. 
Our children came with some 
knowledge but never any really 
spoken background in the language, 
and they went to school on 
September I, into an all-Hebrew 
speaking environment. For awhile 
they were bored for they could not 
actively participate verbally but, 
after an adjustment period that 
included special lessons in school, 
they caught on fantastically. 
Journal: To what extent did you 
and your family become members of 
the community? 
Goldstein: We were visitors, ob-
viously; however, within that con-
text, we were quite involved with the 
community. Our daughter belonged 
to a youth group comparable to the 
scouts and, when she went on a five-
day encampment, I served for two 
days as a guard in the camp. 
Unfortunately, when sending 
children to such places in Israel, it is 
necessary that a certain number of 
adults be present to protect them. It is 
a terrible but true fact, which brings 
to fore my involvement, every two to 
three weeks, with the civil guard , a 
corps of civilian volunteers who 
protect the neighborhoods at night 
by patrolling in pairs. Its purpose is 
not to protect neighborhoods from 
violent or street crimes; adults and 
children freely walk, travel by public 
transportation, or hitchhike until 
quite late at night with no fear. The 
patrol function acts as a deterrant, 
primarily in terms of bombings, and 
also acts as an important psy-
chological function for the citizenry 
to participate in their own security 
problems. 
Journal: Was your commitment to 
Israel strong prior to your going? 
Goldstein: Yes, but we became a lot 
more so having lived there. Living 
and dealing with the people directly 
and having friends who are involved 
make one bound to be more com-
mitted to the cause. 
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In addition to practicing law full time, 
Penn Law alumni may also be bankers or novelists 
or active civll libertarians. The experiences 
of three such people reveal how they have thrived 
in their dual careers. 
Doci<..:t ':-lo 
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There are such a vast number of legal questions that 
arise with respect to any loan, the running of the 
institution, the kinds of relationships one has with 
the depositors, what one can and cannot do, how to 
protect the bank's interests, how to make 
something feasible for the borrower-the whole 
realm of uniform commercial code questions. I am 
constantly amazed that bankers don't have little 
lawyers in their vest pockets at all times. 
Betsy Zubrow Cohen, L'66, President / Chairperson 
of the Board of Directors / Chief Executive Officer at 
Jefferson Bank, Downingtown, Pennsylvania, and 
founding partner in the business law firm of Spector, 
Cohen, Hunt and Rosen, Philadelphia, has every right 
to this undoubtedly empirical reflection. 
The extension of her career from the field of business 
law to that of commercial banking seemed a natural 
sequitur; she not only handles the securities work and 
corporate financial problems for her firm but, in the 
past, represented bank holding companies before the 
Federal Reserve Board and banks and borrowers in 
relation to one another. The first-hand opportunity to 
observe regulatory, operational, and loan policies has 
afforded Betsy the advantage of being able to wear two 
hats comfortably-one of lawyer, one of banker-each 
sustaining and complementing the other. 
So how did Jefferson Bank evolve? Betsy Cohen and 
her husband, Edward E. Cohen, L'65, purchased a farm 
in Downington, Chester County, Pennsylvania, some 
years ago for a weekend and summer retreat. 
Familiarizing themselves with the area, they sensed a 
need in the town for a new banking facility-the only 
other having been chartered 110 years prior. Taking 
hold of and verifying that instinct by conducting a 
feasibility study on the vicinity confirmed their 
notions-Downingtown was ready for another banking 
institution. 
A major obstruction lay in the banking department in 
Harrisburg, the state capital, which had neither granted 
a charter in eight or nine years nor seemed inclined to do 
so. However, Betsy was determined that "since I had 
taken the project this far, perhaps it would really be 
worthwhile pursuing it and seeing if all of the 
professionalism that we brought to bear in representing 
other people would bring to bear in this situation and 
develop a persuasive case for a new institution." An 
application was filed with the banking Commission in 
October, 1973, and, in February of 1974, a charter was 
granted. 
While awaiting completion of the shopping center 
that was to house its permanent quarters, the bank 
occupied an 800-square-foot temporary building, 
affectionately nicknamed "the hamburger stand"-now 
the bank's drive-in facility. This small spot had, says 
Betsy, "more assets per square foot than probably any 
other institution in the world." You see, the bank 
opened in October of 1974 with $2,000,000 in capital 
and, at the end of 1975, had over $10,000,000 in assets. 
Obviously, Jefferson Bank is doing exceptionally well 
despite early fears that a new establishment in this small, 
traditionalist town would be met with some resistance. 
Betsy feels that their secret is the high-quality personnel 
gathered to run the bank. "Over the c0urse of the first 
six months, we were able to convince people that, if 
nothing else, we really cared about their problems, and 
this has proven a very welcome attitude." Because of 
size, larger banking institutions are forced to cir-
cumscribe the activities of the banking personnel 
providing services, thus limiting the solving of special 
problems presented by customers. At Jefferson, the 
inability to solve a problem is not dismissed with an "it-
is-not-bank-policy" response. Rather, a difficulty 
triggers the beginning of staff discussion and analysis: 
Why was this problem not solved? And how can it be 
resolved next time? The customers' positive reactions to 
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this sense of concern, says Betsy Cohen, has made the 
difference "that has enabled us to grow in our 
relationships with people. I like to think that the lawyer 
in me has provided this problem-solving approach." 
And what of this special personnel at Jefferson Bank? 
Many of its major officers are women who previously 
held banking positions but, perhaps, were not given the 
opportunities to exercise their creativity elsewhere. A 
case in point is the controller, who had been employed in 
banking for many years and is finally being afforded an 
outlet for the expertise she has developed. Ap-
proximately 80 percent of the bank's employment 
population, many of whom are on the lower end of the 
responsibility and pay scales, are women. As Betsy 
notes, 
Most discrimination suits by women against banks 
claim that they [women] have not been permitted 
into the mainstream of bank promotions; they 
never get the chance to go up- only across. This is 
not true at Jefferson Bank since we start at the top. 
Jefferson is not a concern that, like many others 
surfacing in our country, caters only to women. It does 
for everyone what these banks do exclusively for the 
female population. Incidentally, the executive vice-
president and director in charge of daily operations is a 
man who has accumula.ted some years of banking 
experience and is also being given the opportunity to 
grow in his position. 
One can analogize officers in a "country bank" to 
general practitioners in a modest-sized firm. Not only 
do they "sweep the floors," but they must be able to 
absorb a wide range of information, since the luxury of 
many people in specific job areas is not available. And, if 
the customer is to be satisfied, which seems to be a prime 
goal at Jefferson Bank, then each new situation and / or 
problem is an exercise in the art of the possible. 
Betsy Cohen has two irreconcilable points of view on 
the question of a bank's accountability to its investors 
and the public in the form of full disclosure of 
information. She believes that the knowledge that 
disclosure will be made is healthy for the corporate 
officers, on whose actions it will have a restraining 
effect, and for the public, who is entitled to information. 
On the other hand, a bank, besides fulfilling its 
traditional financial transactions, often serves as 
financial counselor to its customers. For this to be 
accomplished effectively, total confidence in the 
institution and its professional people is mandatory. 
"Disclosure, therefore, in good times, might be fine; in 
bad times, it could taint this sense of security." Perhaps 
this feeling could be obviated once people realized that 
banks have, as Betsy explains, 
human failings that don't necessarily relate to the 
soundness of the institution. It need not have an 
absolutely error-free record in terms of the 
judgment on the types of loans that it makes, in 
order to fulfill a valid purpose in financial 
counseling. If information about a financial 
concern would be presented effectively without 
impairing its ability to function, should it deserve 
to function, then I think that good disclosure rules 
would have been reached. 
Until recently, Betsy Cohen literally divided her time 
between lawyer-ing and banking, spending mornings in 
Philadelphia practicing law and afternoons in Down-
ingtown at the Bank. She intends, in the next several 
months, to devote herself completely to Jefferson. It is 
in a period of enormous growth-another branch has 
been approved and a site chosen-and "unless this small 
ammount of time is captured, the many opportunities 
built over the past year will not be fully developed." 
There is another career of which this woman is very 
proud- that of being a mother. She and her husband 
are the parents of three children, aged 6, 5 and 2. 
Betsy Zubrow Cohen is, indeed, one of those truly 
exceptional people. Gracious, acutely intelligent, only 
34 years old and already successful in two careers. What 
next? The best may be yet to come. 
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LAWYER/~~W~~ ~~rn5~00uillOO~ill~ RUTH B. ROSENBERG, L'63 
Children living in the State of New York should 
include Ruth Rosenberg in their nightly prayers. They 
have much to be grateful for since she has not only 
awakened the courts to the question of the rights of 
children to independent legal representation but has 
also laid some important groundwork for the deter-
mination of their rights to equal protection. 
In February 1975, Ruth B. Rosenberg, L'63, on 
behalf of the New York Civil Liberties Union, entered a 
case in which she, as the legal representative of a child , 
established that the interests of the child were distinct 
and apart from those of the other parties in the case and 
were deserving of equal consideration under law. 
A 17 -year-old woman had gone to court to regain 
custody of her 2\12-year-old daughter whom she had 
placed in foster care when the child was 4 months old. 
The foster parents refused to produce or make known 
the whereabouts of the child until a full hearing was held 
to determine the child's future , thus provoking the court 
to send the foster father to jail on contempt charges and 
resulting in the granting of a summary judgment 
directing that the child be returned to the biological 
mother. An appeal was taken. Rosenberg recounts her 
feelings at the time: 
I was appalled at these actions from my point of 
view as a lawyer, a parent, and a person concerned 
with the protection of civil liberties. A child is not a 
pawn or an object that gets handed over to 
someone with better proprietary rights like a piano 
or chandelier. Here was this little girl who was 
going to be returned without ever having had an 
opportunity for the court to review what was best 
for her. There had been no inquiry as to how the 
child had changed over the years since she had been 
placed in foster care. What had become her 
attachments? What kind of emotional damage 
would be caused by removing the child from her 
foster home? What was the biological mother like 
now? Was she capable of handling the child? Not 
one of these questions had been explored . 
So, Ruth Rosenberg entered the case, having 
convinced the Court that she would have a better 
opportunity to do justice to the appeal on the granting 
of summary judgment than the legal aid law guardian 
who represented the child at the original abortive 
hearing. And so it was that Rosenberg successfully 
argued before the appellate division that the child had 
a right to "her own day in court." 
The rest is history. The case returned to the family 
court where extensive inquiries and full psychiatric 
studies of all parties were made. Rosenberg herself 
spent hundreds of hours developing evidence that the 
biological parent was, in fact, unfit to mother the child 
and that the child's best interests were served by 
adoption by the foster parents where she had enjoyed a 
loving, stable environment and had developed soundly 
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and happily. After a four-week trial the decision came 
down denying the mother's request for the child's 
return. 
Significantly, the final ruling included five obser-
vations made by the court pertaining to the lack of 
available means to invoke the standards of protection 
for children, the needs and rights of children to 
independent legal representation, and the changes that 
must be made within the system to ensure them proper: 
and fair delivery of legal services. An additional reward 
for Rosenberg must have been the judicial recognition 
of these fundamental principles. 
This case is unusual fare for a partner in the 100-year 
old firm of Nixon, Hargrave, Devans and Doyle in 
Rochester, New York. Yet Ruth Rosenberg, who 
practices law in the zoning, land use, preservation code, 
and litigation areas of real estate law, has maintained 
her intense, active commitment to the causes of human 
rights and civil liberties. 
The ability to pursue her personal commitment to 
civil liberties' causes is itself a reflection of the 
commitment of the nearly I 00 attorney firm of which 
she is a part. The firm, long known for its respon-
siveness to the traditional calls upon attorneys to 
support community agencies, encourages Rosenberg 
and many other attorneys in the devotion of con-
siderable time to less traditional social causes. The case 
in which Rosenberg acted as Law Guardian saw nine 
other attorneys in the office participate at various 
times, totalling several hundred hours in addition to 
the many hundreds of hours she spent in preparation 
and court time. 
Her volunteer work with the New York Civil 
Liberties Union has been manifold. Organizationally, 
over the years she has held top positions on the state 
and local boards; professionally, her gifts as a talented 
advocate have resulted in many victories. In the 
turbulent 1960's, a busy decade for civil libertarians, 
Rosenberg, under the aegis of the NYCLU, handled 
cases involving the rights of students- one in which 
students protested a dress code imposed by the school 
administration and another concerning the suspension 
of six students accused of incorporating allegedly "four 
letter words" into a school election poster. It was 
during this period that many people were charged with 
desecrating the American flag and protesting the war in 
Vietnam, and Ruth Rosenberg did her share of 
representing young people in this area. 
She represented the City of Rochester in a matter 
that had wide civil liberties implications involving the 
City's Police Advisory Board. This nonpolice organiza-
tion, which reviewed charges of excessive physical 
force, was created in an effort to assuage Rochester's 
outraged black and economically deprived citizens 
when, during a time of racial unrest, a policeman's 
bullet paralyzed a man assumed to be a burglar. The 
local policeman's organization challenged the board's 
right to exist and Rosenberg, taking the case at the first 
appeal level, successfully carried it to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, where her motion to dismiss for want of a 
substantial federal question was granted. The board 
was ruled legal, and Rosenberg won again. 
She participates in other community organizations 
such as the Board of Trustees of the Monroe County 
Bar Association, the Pre-Trial Services Corporation, 
the Jewish Federation, and the Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Children, at all times asserting 
the civil liberties' point of view to audiences of mixed 
persuasion on those issues. 
Where did she develop her skills and expertise as a 
trial Ia wyer? In 1964, as the first woman to be hired by 
the then Philadelphia firm of Blank, Rudenko, Klaus 
and Rome, she worked as a member of a trial team 
consisting of Edwin Rome, L'40, and Morris Weisberg, 
L'47. 
I could not have asked for two more talented 
people in the world to have trained me. Morry 
Weisberg taught me to think like a lawyer and to 
attend to the skills of putting down on paper with 
clarity and persuasiveness the position of my 
client. As for Ed Rome, I have never seen a trial 
lawyer with such talent, grace and genius. He has 
served as the model against which I measure my 
own efforts. 
Ruth Rosenberg utilizes her career and, specifically, 
her abilities as an advocate in a very special way. One 
must admire her courage, for the causes she defends are, 
most often, not those to which a conservative communi-
ty might be sympathetic. Yet, she is most influential and 
is looked upon with great respect in the Rochester area. 
One suspects that, over the years, her sincerity, her 
superior mental abilities, and her successful record of 
protecting those values that she considers right have 
afforded her credibility. 
In addition to managing her diverse law practice, she 
and her husband, Allen P. Rosenberg, an attorney with 
the Administration at the University of Rochester and, 
incidentally, the U.S. Olympic Crew Coach, are raising 
four children. 
The Rosenberg children together with the other 
young people all over New York State are very fortunate 
that a Ruth Rosenberg is out there championing their 
rights. They could not hope for a better ally. 
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LAWYER/~illJW~~~~lf ARTHUR R. G. SOLMSSEN,'53 
One might envlSlon the Saul Bellows and Joseph 
Hellers of our day agonizingly composing their "great 
American novels" in solitary New England or Bahamian 
retreats. One also might suppose the inner offices of an 
elegant, archetypal Philadelphia law firm, the location 
least conducive to inspiring a writer's creative genius. 
Yet, Arthur R.G. Solmssen, L'53, corporate partner 
with the firm, Saul, Ewing, Remick and Saul, 
Philadelphia, is a successful novelist- writing SEC 
documents by day and fiction by night. 
He appears most content comingling the two worlds. 
The lawyer Solmssen not only financially subsidizes the 
writer (although his books do sell quite well) but 
provides subject matter for the novels; conversely, 
author Solmssen offers the technical knowledge and 
expertise necessary to the writing of bond issues. What 
more perfect a combination? 
His three novels, of which two have merited Book-of-
the-Month Club or Literary Guild recognition, might be 
viewed a trilogy. They are loosely related one to the 
other as a result of Solmssen's continuing dissection of 
the legal community and of society in general; his 
allusions to Penn Law School and Philadelphia and its 
environs; the reappearance and exploration of 
characters encountered in previous works; and, most 
significantly, the recurrent setting of the established 
establishment Philadelphia law firm of Conyers & 
Dean. Each work, however, is its own entity, possessing 
a complex protagonist, intricate plots and subplots, and 
well-delineated supporting characters. 
Rittenhouse Square, Solmssen's first novel , 
chronicles the societal unrest and social changes 
characteristic of the 1960s. This dramatic backdrop 
complements the story of Ben Butler, a fledgling lawyer, 
who was loaned by Conyers & Dean to the voluntary 
defender's office and, after a month there, discovered 
the rewards intrinsic to the defense of the helpless and 
the excitement to be found in the criminal courtroom. 
His return to the womblike world of mergers, deben-
tures, and finance forced a crucial reevaluation of his 
priorities. 
The plot of Alexander's Feast, the second novel, 
published in 1971 , is extremely complex. Its action takes 
place in two cities- Philadelphia and Salzburg, Austria 
at the site of what Solmssen calls "The American 
Academy in Europe" but which bears close resemblance 
to the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies- and 
during two time periods, just after World War II and in 
the 1960s. The life and times of Graham Anders, partner 
in Conyers & Dean and the novel's multidimensional 
protagonist, are described amidst these settings and in 
these time periods. 
Solmssen's latest novel, The Comfort Letter, a Book-
of-the-Month Club aiternate selection, explores the 
personality of Ordway Smith, another partner in 
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Conyers & Dean. He is an "everyman," not brilliant or 
particularly dynamic but, as a result of his terrific social 
connections, is among the firm's important "business-
getters." The novel traces the evolution and SEC 
registration of $100,000,000 in debentures and Ordway 
Smith's handling of his erratic, difficult client, the head 
of the conglomerate that is floating the issue. In the 
December 1975 edition of Philadelphia Magazine, 
Professor Louis B. Schwartz presented his views on the 
book: 
Can one distill literature from the taut, dry world of 
corporate finance or drama from the ethical crises 
of middle-aged lawyers who run errands for take-
over buccaneers? The Comfort Letter answers with 
a tingling yes .. . Readers who feel guilt when 
experiencing merely sensuous pleasure in a good 
story will find here education and insight to gratify 
the most Puritan lust for self-improvement. .. For 
Solmssen's book is a sociology of power. . . a 
textbook in the psychology of entrepreneurship. 
Arthur Solmssen began his career as a raconteur very 
early; as a child he entertained classmates who should 
have been studying. He does not remember a time when 
he did not have a story inside wanting to emerge. At 
Harvard College, he did newspaper work but did not 
write seriously until he became well established as a 
lawyer. His legal education and first-hand experience as 
a practicing attorney provided Solmssen with the 
material to utilize his writing abilities. 
Before I became a lawyer, no one would publish my 
work. Perhaps I had nothing to say. Now I do. This 
fascination readers have with the world of the 
lawyer has made those who can explain it with 
clarity- Louis Auchincloss and others- writers 
people want to read. 
Solmssen admits to having characters living in his 
head , waiting to come out and be developed fully. He 
did just this in the case of Ordway Smith, the main 
character in The Comfort Letter, whom he was unable 
to forget since Smith's minor role in Rittenhouse 
Square. Solmssen dismisses his characters as pure 
invention, amalgamations of many types of people. 
However, in Alexander's Feast, one character was 
partially fashioned upon a Penn Law professor, now 
deceased, who made a vivid impression on his students. 
When asked ·how much of his work is 
autobiographical, Solmssen replied, "I don't know. All 
of it? None of it? Can it be measured? Some claim that 
everything written by an author is autobiographical, but 
that's not true. A lot is made up. Sometimes ALL of it. 
I've talked with other writers about the curious fact that, 
after you have finished a book, you can't always 
remember what is real, what was researched, and what 
was invented." He does, however, seem to draw heavily 
from personal experiences for the framework of his 
novels. Ben Butler worked for a month in the 
Philadelphia defender's office, as did Solmssen. 
Graham Anders participated in an international law 
conference at an academy modeled after the Salzburg 
Seminar in Austria. Solmssen was there in 1961 as an 
American Fellow and visited many times thereafter. The 
Comfort Letter so realistically describes, among other 
aspects, the complexities of the business practice- the 
area of the law in which Solmssen is actively engaged. 
There are, of course, the "constants" found in each 
novel- the settings of Philadelphia and its Main Line 
suburbs, the law office, Penn Law School- all obvious 
parts of Solmssen's life experiences. 
Besides being a fine craftsman, he reveals a consum-
mate knowledge of his area of specialization together 
with the ability to" articulate its intricacies. Apropos of 
this, Professor Schwartz said in a review of one of 
Solmssen's books, "His novels make fine literature out 
of investment maneuvers, proxy fights, and the tricky 
use of the antitrust laws- matters more often explored 
in The Wall Street Journal than in humanistic writing" 
(The Philddelphia Bulletin, November 14, 1971). 
Arthur Solmssen is a refreshingly open, easy, 
unassuming person. It is amazing how these qualities of 
informality are carried into his writing. At the outset, a 
reader immediately feels included and comfortable, as 
though with a long-time friend. One should not be 
fooled , however, by this low-keyed, first-person 
narrative style, for the complex personalities that 
develop and the highly intricate plots that unfold make 
for exciting and tension-filled reading. 
And what of the future? Will the trilogy become a 
quartet? Are there situations and characters within 
Arthur R.G. Solmssen yearning to emerge and say "I 
am"? The answers are probably in the affirmative, for 
this rare man, this lawyer / author, who is balancing and 
combining two fulfilling careers with equal mastery has 
stated, unequivocally, that he has no intention of 
relinquishing either one. 
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Professor Alexander Capron was 
named a Johns Hopkins Centennial 
Scholar and addressed a meeting at 
that university in October 1975. 
His book, Catastrophic Diseases: 
Who Decides What?, written with 
Jay Katz and published by the 
Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 
is a legal and psychosocial analysis of 
decision making about research and 
treatment in advanced fields of 
biomedicine, using kidney dialysis 
and organ transplantation as the 
examples under scrutiny. 
Capron testified at the request of 
the New York Assembly Committee 
on Health on a bill to adopt a 
legislative "definition of death" in 
New York, December 1975. He has 
also appeared on numerous televi-
sion panels discussing the case of 
Karen Ann Quinlan and, generally, 
the question of euthanasia j"allowing 
to die ." 
He was a panelist at the Bench-Bar 
Conference of the Philadelphia Bar 
Association in September 1975. 
Mr. Capron is presently acting 
Vice-Dean of the Law School. 
Professor James 0. Freedman is the 
author of an article "Delegation of 
Power and Institutional Com-
petence" that appears in the Winter 
1976 issue of the University of 
Chicago Law Review. 
On February 14, 1976, he delivered 
a paper entitled "Expertise and the 
Administrative Process," before the 
Council of the Section on Ad-
ministrative Law of the American 
Bar Association. An article based on 
that paper will be published in the 
Administrative Law Review. 
Professor Stephen R. Goldstein 
published an article entitled, 
"Academic Freedom: Its Meaning 
and Underlying Premises as Seen 
through the American Experience," 
II Israel Law Review 1, January, 
1976. 
Mr. Goldstein was also selected as 
the area chairman of the 
Metropolitan Region of American 
Professors for Peace in the Middle 
East. 
Professor George L. Haskins was 
elected an Honorary Fellow of the 
American Society of Legal History at 
the society's annual meeting. The 
official announcement stated that 
"this election represents the highest 
honor the Society can bestow upon a 
member." Fewer than five Americans 
have been awarded the title . 
In January, Mr. Haskins attended 
the meeting of the American Council 
of Learned Societies in Baltimore, as 
well as the winter meeting of the 
Maine Bar Association in Bangor. 
Mr. Haskins is scheduled to 
present a paper on the "Rights and 
Obligations of Government with 
Respect to Rural Communities in 
Colonial America" in May before the 
Societe Jean Bodin pour I'Histoire 
Comparative des Institutions, which 
will be meeting in conjunction with 
the Polska Akademia Nauk at War-
saw. 
Professor Robert H. Mundheim has 
been elected Vice-Chairman of the 
Board of Directors of Investor 
Responsibility Research Center, a 
nonprofit corporation that analyzes 
shareholder proposals and writes in-
depth studies of important social 
responsibility issues faced by United 
States corporations. 
In December 1975, he chaired a 
discussion of "The Corporate 
Watergate," an examination of il-
legal political contributions and 
questionable foreign payments by 
United States corporations, held at 
the Law School, with Professor 
Louis B. Schwartz as one of the 
panelists. Roughly I 00 represen-
tatives of financial institutions, uni-
versities, foundations , and church 
groups attended the program, jointly 
sponsored by Investor Responsibility 
2 7 
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Research Center and the Law 
School's Center for the Study of 
Financial Institutions. Professor 
Mundheim participated in panels 
discussing SEC questions relating to 
the subject at The University of 
California Securities Regulation 
Institute in San Diego in January 
1976 and at a seminar sponsored by 
Institutional Investor, Inc., in New 
York in December 1975. 
Mr. Mundheim, with Arthur 
Fleischer, Jr., cochaired The Prac-
ticing Law Institute's Seventh An-
nual Institute in Securities Regula-
tion in New York City in November. 
The program reviewed major 
developments in securities regulation 
and attracted roughly 650 lawyers 
from the United States and Canada. 
Professor Covey T. Oliver is consul-
tant to the Department of State on 
matters relating to the Law of the Sea 
negotiations for the United States 
and is a member of the United States 
delegation to the Third Session of the 
UN Conference on the Law of the 
Sea, which opened in New York in 
March. 
Mr. Oliver will teach international 
law at St. Mary's University this 
summer and hen address the thirtieth 
International Conference on Human 
Sciences in Mexico City on the 
following topics: "Export Cartels, 
Trade, Aid, and International 
Justice." 
He will be on scholarly leave 
during the spring semester, 1977, and 
will be based in Paris, doing research 
through the Office of Economic 
Cooperation and Development on a 
comparison between the develop-
ment assistance policy of the Euro-
pean Economic Community and that 
of its member states against a 
background of United States 
assistance policy. European 
positions as to the role and place of 
direct foreign investment in the 
development process will also be 
examined . 
Professor Oliver was selected to 
prepare and has completed a study of 
the Constitution and the future of 
United States foreign policy for a 
bicentennial review of the Constitu-
tion by highly qualified persons, 
under the sponsorship of the 
American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, in Philadelphia this 
April. 
Professor Stephen J. Schulhofer has 
been appointed Reporter to the 
Speedy Trial Planning Group of the 
U.S. District Court for the District of 
Delaware. 
He is also serving as a consultant in 
connection with the National Survey 
of Crime Severity, a three-year 
project of the University's Center for 
Studies in Criminology and Criminal 
Law. 
In April, Mr. Schulhofer will 
serve, along with several other 
faculty members, as a rapporteur for 
the Bicentennial Conference on the 
Constitution, sponsored by the 
American Academy of Political and 
Social Science. 
Professor Louis B. Schwartz 
delivered a talk to the University of 
Pennsylvania College for Women 
Program on Continuing Education 
Series entitled, "Convicting the 
Innocent: Should There be Criminal 
Responsibility for Conduct At-
tributable to Ignorance, Mental 
Illness, or Bad Judgment?," in 
November 1975. 
In December 1975, Mr. Schwartz 
was a panelist, along with Securities 
and Exchange Commissioner 
Sommers and others, on "The Cor-
porate Watergate" (pertaining to 
illegal political contributions and 
bribery of foreign officials) at the 
Conference on Investor Respon-
sibility sponsored by the Investor's 
Responsibility Research Center. 
He reviewed Arthur R.G. 
Solmssen's The Comfort Letter 
Little, Brown, 1975, in Philadelphia 
Magazine, December 1975, pp. 54-
55. Mr. Schwartz' article, "The 
Cultural Deficit in Broadcasting," 
appeared in 26 Journal of Com-
munication, 58, Winter 1976. 
Throughout the year 1975, he 
served as consultant with various 
senators and congressmen on the 
reform of federal criminal laws and 
participated in various radio inter-
view shows discussing this subject 
among others. 
Former Dean and Professor Bernard 
Wolfman addressed members of the 
Stanford University Alumni 
Association on the subject of "The 
Federal Income Tax System-
Process, Structure, and Reform," in 
March. 
In July 1976, Mr. Wolfman will 
become Fessenden Professor of Law 
at Harvard Law School (see Sym-
posium in this issue). 
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'34 John S. Bernheimer an-
nounces the relocation of his law 
office to 6523 North 9th Street, 
Philadelphia, 19126. 
W. Clark Hanna has 
retired as the Prothonotary's 
Solicitor, Court of Common Pleas, 
Philadelphia, and has announced the 
resumption of his private practice at 
1420 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, 
19102, and at 21 Church Road, 
Norristown, Pennsylvania, 19403. 
'38 Irving R. Segal was 
elected to a four-year term as a 
Regent of the American College of 
Trial Lawyers, an organization in 
which he was active for approximate-
ly 15 years. Mr. Segal is a partner in 
the firm of Schnader, Harrison, 
Segal and Lewis, Philadelphia. 
'41 John J. Dautrich has 
been elected to serve as President of 
the Association of Defense Counsel 
during the year 1976. He is a partner 
in the firm of White and Williams, 
Philadelphia. 
'47 Robert M. Landis, a 
former Chancellor of the 
Philadelphia Bar Association, was 
elected President of the National 
Conference of Bar Presidents at the 
annual meeting of the American Bar 
Association held in the summer of 
1975. 
James P. Schellenger, 
Philadelphia, has been named Chief 
Executive Officer of the Delaware 
Management Company, Inc. He also 
serves on the Board of Governors of 
the Investment Company Institute. 
'50 Hon. Joseph T. LaBrum, 
Jr., was recently sworn as Common 
Pleas Court Judge in Delaware 
County, Pennsylvania. 
'51 Harold Cramer, Chair-
man of the initial Board of Directors 
of Graduate Hospital, has been 
named President of a new Graduate 
Hospital foundation created to ac-
quire capital gifts, endowments, 
annual giving, etc. Mr. Cramer is a 
partner in the Philadelphia law firm 
of Mesirov, Gelman, Jaffe and 
Cramer. 
Gerald J. Haas of 
Philadelphia coplanned a Penn-
sylvania workmen's compensation 
course sponsored by the Penn-
sylvania Bar Institute at which he 
lectured. Mr. Haas was coauthor of 
the manual as well. 
'53 Thomas N. O'Neill, Jr., 
began his term as forty-ninth 
Chancellor of the Philadelphia Bar 
Association in January 1976. 
Hon. David N. Savitt, 
Philadelphia Court of Common 
Pleas, has been appointed Court 
Administrator by President Judge 
Edward J. Bradley, L'53, as of 
December 1, 1975. 
'54 Hon. Berel Caesar was 
named by Pennsylvania Governor 
Milton J. Shapp to a seat on the 
Philadelphia Common Pleas Court 
bench, replacing former Judge D. 
Donald Jamieson, L'50. 
Morton S. Gorelick was 
elected to a one-year term as Presi-
dent of the Cheltenham Township 
Board of School Directors, Elkins 
Park, Pennsylvania. Mr. Gorelick is 
a partner in the firm of Steinberg, 
Greenstein, Richman and Price, 
Philadelphia. 
Sidney T. Yates of New-
town, Pennsylvania, was elected to 
the Board of Directors of Saint Mary 
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Hospital, Langhorne, Pennsylvania, 
where he also serves as solicitor and 
secretary of the hospital authority. 
Mr. Yates is a partner in the firm of 
Stuckert, Yates and Drewson. 
'55 Hon. Irving M. Hirsh was 
recently reappointed as Judge of the 
Municipal Court of North Plainfield, 
New Jersey, for another three year 
term. 
'56 George L. Bernstein of 
Philadelphia will be President of the 
Pennsylvania Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants as of June, 1976. 
He is the National Management 
Advisory Services Partner in the 
accounting firm of Laventhol and 
Horwath. 
Charles F. Ludwig has 
joined the firm of Silver, Lovitz and 
Atkinson, l>.A., 3 Penn Center Plaza, 
Philadelphia, 19102, in the practice 
of insurance company law, regula-
tion, investments, and litigation. 
'57 Jerrold V. Moss of 
Philadelphia is Chairman of the 
Government Study Commission, 
which has drafted and recommended 
a home-rule charter for Cheltenham 
Township, Montgomery County, 
Pennsylvania. The charter will be 
submitted to the voters at the 
November elections. His offices are 
at 1201 Chestnut Street, 
Philadelphia. 
'60 Rodman Kober has been 
named Vice-President in charge of 
transportation by Continental Grain 
Company's North American Grain 
Division, New York. He also serves 
as Deputy Mayor and Police Com-
missioner of Manalapan Township, 
New Jersey. 
Hon. John A. Walter, 
Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon 
County, was elected to a I 0-year tenrt 
in November 1975. 
'63 Gerald M. Levin of New 
York, President and Chief Executive 
of Home Box Office, Inc., addressed 
the International Radio and Televi-
sion Society's Fifth Annual 
Faculty I Industry Seminar m 
Tarrytown, New York, in November. 
Mr. Levin, since joining Home Box 
Office, Inc., in 1973 has developed it 
into one of the leading pay cable 
networks in the industry and the first 
cable system to go nationwide by 
satellite. 
Faith Ryan Whittlesey of 
Haverford, Pennsylvania, was 
elected Delaware County Com-
missioner, distinguishing her as the 
first woman in the State of Penn-
sylvania to become a county com-
missioner. Ms. Whittlesey resigned a 
seat on the Pennsylvania state 
legislature to assume the county post. 
Prior to his death in 
January 1976, Edwin D. Wolf was 
the recipient of two awards: the 
Haverford Award, given each year by 
Haverford College to notable, de-
serving alumni; and the 1975 Fidelity 
Bank Award, presented at the An-
nual Meeting of the Philadelphia Bar 
Association in recognition of Ned 
Wolfs significant contributions to 
public interest law in the City of 
Philadelphia, specifically for his 
work as Director of the Public 
Interest Law Center of Philadelphia 
(PILCOP). 
'64 Robert W. Tollen has 
become a partner in the firm of 
Chickering and Gregory, Ill Sutter 
Street, San Francisco, California, 
94104, specializing in the representa-
tion of management in the private 
and public sectors in labor relations 
and related matters. 
'65 Richard Gordimer has 
been named general partner in charge 
of the tax department in the office of 
Seidman and Seidman, Hartford 
Building, Orlando, Florida, 32800. 
Harry R. Marshall, Jr., 
has accepted a position with the 
Office of the General Counsel to the 
U.S. Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency and will reside in Chevy 
Chase, Maryland. 
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'66 Patricia Ann Metzer has 
become Associate Tax Legislative 
Counsel with the U.S. Treasury 
Department, Washington, D.C. 
'67 Carmen L. Gentile an-
nounces the formation of a 
partnership under the firm name 
Bruder and Gentile, 1750 Penn-
sylvania Avenue, N. W., Suite 301 A, 
Washington, D.C., 20006. 
Stephen Schoeman an-
nounces the formation of his law 
firm, Brotmann, Kornreich and 
Schoeman, with offices at 271 North 
Avenue, New Rochelle, New York, 
and 60 East 42nd Street, New York 
City. 
Eric C. Woglom of New 
York has become a partner in the 
firm Fish and Neave, 277 Park 
Avenue, New York, 10017. 
'69 Eric M. Lowin an-
I10unces the formation of his new 
partnership under the firm name 
Bloom and Lowin, 666 Fifth Avenue, 
New York, 10019. 
Richard P. Sills IS 
associated with the Washington, 
D.C., firm of Ginsberg, Feldman and 
Bress. In 1974, he received an LL. M. 
in taxation with highest honors from 
the George Washington University 
National Law Center. He is the 
author of "The 'Dealer-Investor' 
Problem: Observations, Analysis, 
and Suggestions for Future Develop-
ment," which was published in the 
Fall 1974 issue of The Journal of 
Real Estate Taxation. 
'71 Paul J. Duca has become 
a member of the firm Silver, Lovitz 
and Atkinson, P.A., 3 Penn Center 
Plaza, Philadelphia, 19102. 
'72 Keith S. Armour of the 
firm Shultz, Fahy and Street, has 
established a firm office at 100 East 
Main Street, Stillman Valley, Il-
linois, 61084. 
Frank W. Bubb, III, is 
presently employed at the Scott 
Paper Company, Philadelphia. 
Joseph H. Cooper has 
joined the legal staff of The New 
Yorker magazine. His article "The 
Law School Way" appeared in The 
Journal of Legal Education (vol. 27, 
no. 3, 1975), and his "Business 
Executives as Authors- The Wallace 
Stevens Tradition" appeared in the 
December 1975 issue of Finance. Mr. 
Cooper served as speechwriter and 
publications editor for the National 
Association of Securities Dealers in 
Washington, D.C., during 1975. 
'73 Joseph P. Coviello has 
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announced the formation of his law 
firm, Dunn, Byrne, Coviello and 
Eisenstein, with offices at 234 Scran-
ton Life Building, Scranton, Penn-
sylvania, 18503, and 234 East College 
Avenue, State College, Penn-
sylvania, 1680 I. He is Solicitor to the 
Dunmore school district and is 
cofounder and Secretary Treasurer 
of San barco Planning Services, Inc., 
an educational consulting firm. Mr. 
Coviello spoke at the 1975 Law 
Alumni Day seminar on the topic of 
the Pennsylvania Sunshine Law. 
Steven A. Kauffman has 
joined the law firm of Gever and 
Grife, 1313 Robinson Building, 
Philadelphia, 191 02. 
Frank J. Sensenbrenner, 
Jr., is the Assistant Attorney General 
in the legal services division of the 
Justice Department for the State of 
Wisconsin. 
George W. Westervelt, 
Jr., has announced the formation of 
his firm, Royle and Westervelt, 738 
Main Street, Stroudsburg, Penn-
sylvania, 18360. 
'7 4 Leonard Cooper has 
become an associate in the firm 
Fidelman, Wolffe and Waldron, 
Suite 300, 2120 L Street, N.W., 
Washington, D.C., 20037, specializ-
ing in patent law. 
James M. Franklin is a 
Deputy District Attorney in 
Colorado Springs, Colorado. 
Jeffrey Horowitz and his 
wife announce the birth of their son, 
Joshua Andrew, on October 11, 
1975. 
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C:nd note! 
From the Editor 
publication of his challenging article 
something special has been recorded 
for posterity. 
Fourth Annual Tennis Tournament 
held in December. 
Many are the rewards of this job. 
Having worked with the late Ned 
Wolf on his article, "I Have Promises 
to Keep ... ," in the Winter 1975 
Journal, was one such rare ex-
perience. His passing came just days 
after the Journal was circulated. 
Professor Robert H. Mundheim 
displayed incredible modesty when 
he described the quality of his tennis 
game in our "Conversation with ... " 
Winter 1975 Journal, as something 
"to be kept a closely guarded secret." 
Well, the secret is OUT. Mundheim 
and his partner were the first-place, 
silver trophy team m the 
Philadelphia Bar Association's 
In this issue, the Journal in-
troduces a new forumlike section, 
"Something to Say ... a personal 
view," to which we hope you will 
contribute. 
It is our desire that the new feature 
will serve as a vehicle by which in-
depth, personal opinions on subjects 
of your choice may be freely ex-
pressed in article form. 
Not only was the personal ex-
posure to this courageous man a gift 
in itself, but one feels that with the 
In Memoriam 
'13 Isaac D. Levy, Philadelphia, November 29, 1975 
'15 Justin S. Hamburger, Philadelphia, October 18, 1975 
Please let us hear from you. 
' 17 John P. Creveling, Allentown, Pennsylvania, December 15, 1975 
'21 Robert Dechert, Gladwyne, Pennsylvania, November 8, 1975 
'22 Thomas McConnell , III , Haverford, Pennsylvania, November 6, 1975 
'24 Charles D. Smeltzer, Philadelphia, December 26, 1975 
'30 Peritz Berman, Chester, Pennsylvania, November 21 , 1975 
Bernard M. Zimmerman, Lancaster, Pennsylvania, December 2, 1975 
'32 Eugene A. Nogi, Scranton, Pennsylvania, December 7, 1975 
'37 Bruce S. Cronlund, Horsham, Pennsylvania, April 22, 1975 
Irwin Slipakoff, Miami, Florida, September 2, 1975 
'38 Frederick Y. Dietrick, Williamsport , Pennsylvania, December 10, 1975 
Wendell R. Good, Erie, Pennsylvania, August 22, 1975 
'42 Norman H. Abrahamson, Philadelphia, January 27, 1976 
'44 William E. Taylor, Wilmington, Delaware, November 27, 1975 
'51 .John F. Healy, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, December 6, 1975 
'54 Bennet N. Hollander, Reston, Virginia, December 27, 1975 
'63 Edwin D. Wolf, Philadelphia, January 21, 1976 
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